Testimony: Hon. Alcee L. Hastings 
Chairman - Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe – US Helsinki Commission

November 8, 2007.

Today’s Helsinki Commission hearing focuses on the current situation in Bosnia, and what needs to be done to help that country move forward with the reforms necessary for European integration.  
 
Of course, to the extent the Balkans is the focus of attention today, that focus is squarely on determining the status of Kosovo. That is, indeed, a major issue and, if handled incorrectly, could lead to further instability in the region.  
 
We cannot, however, neglect what seems to be a growing political crisis in Bosnia. The international community, including the United States, has invested considerable time and resources in the 10 to 15 years -- including troops, diplomatic personnel and financial assistance – to end the violence in Bosnia and rebuild a country devastated by conflict. It would be a serious error if this international effort were allowed to fail.  
 
We also owe it to the people of Bosnia to encourage them to move forward. Yes, many of Bosnia’s politicians can be blamed for the failure to achieve progress, but those politicians are in power at least in part because the wounds of the conflict have not been sufficiently healed. Persons indicted for terrible crimes continue to evade justice. Mass graves continue to be found. The remains of missing family members or loved ones continue to be identified.  
 
It is difficult to exaggerate the true horror of the Bosnian conflict, with its many atrocities including the genocide at Srebrenica, and its impact on the people of the region. Yes, we want the people of Bosnia to look forward, and work toward achieving their country’s integration in Europe. At the same time, it is too easy to tell them simply to forget the past, or to put it behind them. At best, they can only reckon with the past, and come to terms with what happened.  
 
Having lived through the injustices of the segregated South here in the United States, I know how difficult it can be to move on when others refuse even to acknowledge the wrongs that were committed by them or in their name.  
 
One defendant at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, during his sentencing hearing in which there was a plea agreement, is quoted as saying:  
 
“In Bosnia, a neighbor means more than a relative. In Bosnia, having coffee with your neighbor is a ritual, and this is what we trampled on and forgot. We lost ourselves in hatred and brutality. And in this vortex of terrible misfortune and horror, the horror of Srebrenica happened. I will be happy if my testimony helps the families of the victims, if I can spare them having to testify again and relive the horrors and the pain during their testimony. It is my wish that my testimony should help prevent this ever happening again, not just in Bosnia, but anywhere in the world.”

 
These sentiments need repeating, perhaps thousands of times and not just by those who committed the crimes but by those who at the time accepted or even supported what was being done in their name.  
 
Our witnesses at today’s hearing are unquestionably, if not uniquely, qualified to speak on these issues. Their biographies have been made available to the public and will be incorporated into the record, so I will not repeat them here.  
 
I want to welcome Raffi Gregorian, the Principal Deputy High representative in Bosnia. Dr. Gregorian, we look forward to your comments at this critical time. I note that the State Department loaned Cliff Bond, the former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia, to the Helsinki Commission as a senior advisor, and we loaned him back to help your office deal with issues relating to Srebrenica. I hope he is getting the support he needs for the valuable work he is doing. We miss his presence here but know he is needed there.  
 
Next, I welcome Ambassador Douglas Davidson, Head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia. Ambassador, in recent Commission hearings with the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, there was great praise for the work of OSCE field missions. Your mission led the way in establishing a large presence on the ground, including outside the capital city, and providing substantial expertise in areas like elections. The Helsinki Commission is also a strong supporter of the missions, and we hope that they get the personnel and money they need to get the job done. We know this is a challenge today.  
 
Adam Boys is the Chief Operating Officer for the International Commission for Missing Persons. Mr. Boys, helping people learn the fate of lost family members and loved ones must be one of the most emotionally draining activities to undertake in Bosnia, but I believe it can probably be the most rewarding as well. I congratulate you on the accomplishments of the ICMP and look forward to hearing how your work allows people to reckon with the past.  
 
Finally, we have Diane Orentlicher of American University’s Washington College of Law and the Open Society Justice Initiative, who is well known for her work on international law and human rights. How to provide a sense of justice is perhaps the most challenging of all tasks, especially in a place like Bosnia where the injustices were so great. And the challenge is not only to provide some satisfaction to the surviving victims, but also to deter prospective perpetrators of serious crimes that include genocide. It is a sad fact that these crimes were committed in a Europe which was finally whole and free with the conclusion of the Cold War, and equally sad that these crimes have also occurred elsewhere in the world since then, even today. I appreciate your advocacy of efforts which would make this world a much better place, and look forward to your views on the current situation in Bosnia.

Testimony: Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin 
Co-Chairman - Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe – US Helsinki Commission

November 8, 2007

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing today. As you know, the conflict in Bosnia coincided with my early work on this Helsinki Commission. As we look at the situation in that county 10 to 15 years later, it is important to recall how genuinely horrific that conflict was. The atrocities committed during the Bosnian conflict truly represent the worst violations of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act since that document was signed in 1975.  
 
The images of ethnic cleansing of villages and the shelling of Sarajevo may have faded from our own minds, but I am sure those events are still vivid today in the minds of the people of Bosnia, especially if they were the subjects and not the audience of the CNN reports. I firmly believe that we must ask the people of Bosnia to look forward, not back -- to the future, not to the past. We cannot credibly do so, however, without acknowledging that their past is not so easily forgotten, nor so easily forgiven.  
 
That is why justice is so important, and why I have strongly advocated – both here in the Congress but also through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – that all governments cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Based on their different records of cooperation, my efforts have had to focus mostly on Serbia. We want to see Serbia succeed, but the hesitancy if not outright refusal by some in Belgrade to cooperate with the Tribunal by apprehending indicted persons has complicated Serbia’s relations with the rest of Europe, and with the United States. It has also perpetuated an unhealthy, nationalist trend in Serbian politics that should not be accepted as a norm there any more than in any other European country. Finally, it is obvious that getting Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic and the two other at-large indictees to The Hague is important for their surviving victims in Bosnia.  
 
It is also important for Bosnian Serbs in particular to recognize the horrible acts that were committed in their name. Some of their leaders nevertheless have also been less than forthcoming in dealing with these issues.  
 
The international community has a wider stake in this issue. If there was any silver lining to the Bosnian conflict, it was that the international community said for the first time since Nuremburg that the perpetrators as well as planners of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide would be brought to justice. We have since seen this become part of the international response to conflicts elsewhere. Accountability on the international level, however, is still a delicate and complicated issue, and we would be setting a very dangerous precedent for the United States or Europe to drop this as a priority before the trials of the remaining indictees are complete.  
 
I hope today’s hearing will look closely at this issue, and maybe suggest some possible policy recommendations for Europe and the United States. It will also be good to look at how the war crimes chamber in Bosnia is doing, or its counterparts in Serbia or Croatia. We may discuss additional efforts to help the people of Bosnia move forward, including truth commissions. As we do, however, we should be sure the international community remains committed to the completion of the International Tribunal’s work, however long it takes.

Testimony: Mr. Raffi Gregorian 
Principal Deputy High Representative - Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing on outstanding issues in the post-conflict recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This hearing occurs at a critical if not vital moment in the history of post-Dayton Bosnia. Its very survival could be determined in the next few months if not the next few weeks.

Although I am a member of the Department of State, I am here today in my capacity as the Principal Deputy High Representative, presenting the views of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). In June 2006, OHR’s international oversight body, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board, agreed that, subject to a review of the situation in February 2007, OHR would be able to close in mid-2007 and hand-over to an enhanced EU mission.  
 
Indeed, 18 months ago this seemed to be the right choice. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was moving from a stabilization phase to one of integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The only question seemed to be when, not if, BiH would get into NATO and the EU. Defense reforms passed in the autumn of 2005 had begun in earnest, with the former warring armies and entity defense ministries dissolving and a new NATO-compatible, multi-ethnic, single armed force taking shape. Value added-tax was introduced with less trouble and greater success than in any other European country, increasing government revenues and reducing the gray economy. GDP growth remained strong and inflation low. A number of fugitives from the ICTY had surrendered to authorities in BiH after mysteriously arriving from Serbia and other countries. The state and entity parliaments had accepted the EU’s principles for police reform and adopted a political agreement drafted by Republika Srpska (RS) politicians that allowed BiH to begin negotiations with the EU on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). In January 2006 the BiH Council of Ministers (CoM) appointed a Police Reform Directorate (PRD) that began developing the required implementation plan. And lastly, the BiH House of Representatives began considering constitutional modifications intended to improve the efficiency of state-level institutions in dealing with the reforms required to join NATO and the EU.

But by the time the PIC took its initial decision there were already signs of serious trouble ahead. Having announced the intention to leave and hand over “ownership” to the local authorities, the worst instincts of local politicians emerged. The constitutional amendments were the first to suffer when the party of Haris Silajdzic withdrew from the agreement it signed with other parties in Washington in November 2005; a small number of defectors from the other parties to the agreement were thus able to block the amendments with just two votes.

Problems with police reform emerged at roughly the same time: the government of Milorad Dodik that took control of the RS in March 2006 immediately disputed a voting mechanism in the PRD and decided RS representatives would participate only as observers. Nevertheless, Serbs from state-level institutions –some of them very close to Dodik—remained as full members and the PRD continued working.

There followed in short order Milorad Dodik’s infamous suggestion that if Montenegro could become independent, as Kosovo might soon do as well, then RS citizens would be asking why couldn’t they have a referendum on independence too? Dodik apparently liked the response he got from Serbs in the RS, and the international community, not taking Dodik seriously, basically let-him get away with it. It was pre-election rhetoric from someone not thought to be an ardent nationalist, and he assured the then High Representative (HR) it would stop after the elections.

But it did not. On the Bosniak side, Haris Silajdzic, who had scuttled constitutional reform by convincing people that “entity-voting” in the parliament was a feature of the proposed amendments rather than a feature of Dayton, ran an election campaign on promising a “Bosnia without Entities” and the abolition of Republika Srpska as a “genocidal creation.” Such rhetoric fed into the paranoia of RS politicians and served to reinforce the passive-aggressive rhetoric of Dodik.

Police reform remained hostage to the resurgence of nationalist electioneering. The PRD managed to produce only a concept paper by its December deadline, and political leaders refused to allow their members of the BiH CoM to even discuss the matter. Attempts by the international community since then to facilitate a complete agreement in line with previously accepted EU conditions have failed mostly because Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdzic have been unwilling to agree, while their national rivals have been either unwilling or unable to break with them.

Their failure to agree has been attributable to two things. First, each saw police reform as a proxy for constitutional reform. Silajdzic refused to agree to anything that would recognize the existence or legitimacy of the RS, despite it being a feature of Dayton. For his part, Dodik did not want to “give up” the RS Police because he believed it would weaken his position in any future talks on a new constitution. Second, it now seems clear that neither man wanted to give up the control of police they currently exercise through their parties’ participation in government. The fact that the two men eventually signed a meaningless agreement in contradiction with the EU’s conditions and without seeking support from their coalition partners was more about avoiding blame for failure than it was about meeting the EU’s conditions.

The end result is tragic. Despite the fact that SAA negotiations were successfully completed a year ago and all other EU conditions essentially met, BiH seems further than ever from the EU. The most influential politicians in BiH—Dodik and Silajdzic—prefer the isolation of BiH rather than having to meet the EU’s conditions for integration. I say tragic because more than 70% of BiH’s population wants to join the EU, but those same people expect the international community to make it happen rather than demand their leaders do the jobs for which they were elected.

Equally troubling is that the six parties in coalition at the state level are intent on moving forward on drafting a new constitution. Troubling because they blame Dayton-based structures for their inability to agree on police reform, even though those same structures did not prevent defense, intelligence, judicial, tax and other reforms adopted by the previous government. Nor do they recognize that failure to agree on police reform indicates they are probably not responsible enough to deal with something as serious as changing the BiH constitution, which is Annex 4 of Dayton. Their respective stances on constitutional reform are at great variance from each other, but all feature ideas on how to territorially divide up Bosnia. Sadly, most BiH politicians still see politics as a zero-sum game where the goal is to divide wealth amongst cronies rather than create wealth for the common good. They see politics as just an extension of the war by other means despite the fact that the public is interested in improving the economy and getting decent jobs.

Nowhere has the cynicism of politicians been more clearly evident than in the issues surrounding Srebrenica during the first half of this year. In late February, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its verdict in the 14 year-old case of BiH v. Serbia. The ICJ determined that Serbia violated the Genocide Convention by not doing enough to prevent genocide at Srebrenica in July 2005, and was in further violation of international law for refusing to hand over Ratko Mladic, known to be in Serbia for most of the past nine years.

The verdict was deeply disappointing and disturbing to many Bosniaks. After all, the role of Belgrade in directing, financing, and supporting the war in BiH has been well documented. Undaunted by the limited verdict, President Silajdzic nevertheless claimed that the ICJ verdict required the abolition of the RS. The reaction of RS officials—despite clear statements by the international community that the ICJ verdict did NOT mean the end of the RS—was one of contrived paranoia. Certainly the movement by Bosniak politicians to detach Srebrenica from the RS and make it an independent district did not help, nor did threats by Federation war veteran organizations to send 10,000 veterans to Srebrenica to provide security for returnees there. The physical security situation in Srebrenica may have been calm for years, but the ICJ verdict awoke a sense of psychological insecurity among Bosniak returnees there and politicians exploited this to the full.

Only by a concerted effort of OHR and US officials was this volatile situation calmed down before threatened secession or an exodus of Bosniak returnees materialized. Certainly the HR’s timely and astute appointment of Amb. Cliff Bond as his special envoy for Srebrenica helped turn the tide, and let me extend the HR’s thanks to this committee and Fred Turner for letting him take on this task. Success has been achieved in two ways. The first has been by working with local authorities to provide real support for sustainable returns by increasing employment, developing business, and improving infrastructure and social services. The second has been by prodding state and RS authorities to finally deal in a serious and systematic way with the many of the perpetrators of the genocide who are still walking around free today, some of them even in police uniforms. In both of these areas Mr. Dodik’s government has been helpful, despite his defiant and politically destabilizing behavior in other areas.

Let me speak briefly about war crimes issues. BiH and RS authorities are cooperating with the ICTY, but I choose these words carefully. Neither the BiH nor the RS authorities demonstrate any initiative in this area. Almost every action against ICTY fugitives and their support networks occurs at the suggestion of the international community or in response to international actions. Investigations against persons on the so-called “Srebrenica list” had to be spurred by OHR, as has the hiring of additional investigators, amendments to the criminal code, the suspension of police officers suspected of participation in war crimes, and the freezing of assets of war criminal supporters. On a slightly more positive note, the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of BiH has been dealing satisfactorily with those cases transferred to it by the ICTY.

Nevertheless, the real problem lies in Serbia, where most if not all of the remaining fugitives remain within reach of Serbian authorities. The June arrest of Zdravko Tolimir in BiH by RS police after his transfer from Serbia shows that Belgrade can deliver fugitives when and how it wants to. The fact that at numerous former and current ICTY fugitives have spent time in Serbia and other countries further complicates efforts to bring such people to justice.  
 
In sum, the situation in BiH today is grim. Dodik and Silajdzic have no real interest in agreeing on the EU’s police reform conditions for an SAA, despite a mildly encouraging declaration in Mostar last month. The fact is that eventual EU membership is just not enough of an incentive for leaders who are playing for high stakes in the short-term. The idea that these same leaders will agree on a new constitution that will promote political tranquility and prosperity in BiH is at best an illusion.

And now there is a possibility that by the end of this year there will be no effective peacekeeping force to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH. By November 21st the UN Security Council must vote to renew the mandate of the EU peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in BiH, but its extension can not be assumed and could be tied to efforts to end OHR, despite the fact that it is sui generis from Dayton, and not a creature of the UN. Such a turn of events would make it easier for Banja Luka and Belgrade to realize RS secession from BiH in the event Kosovo becomes independent.

The contrived and deliberate over-reaction of RS politicians to measures announced by the HR on October 19 are part of the prelude for the drama to occur between November 21st and the period following the Kosovo Troika’s report to the UN on December 10th. RS government officials will continue to egg on RS NGOs calling for independence, will seek to prevent state institutions from functioning, and will continue with legislative actions meant to facilitate eventual independence. Indeed, as part of this separation strategy, Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica stated that the HR’s measures “endangered” Serbs in BiH and explicitly linked the idea of RS secession with Kosovo independence. This is explosively loaded language, as Milosevic and his henchmen used such terms to justify what he did as self-defense for Serbs. Of course there is no objective basis for the use of such language. The security situation in BiH has been calm for some time now, but may not continue to be so as politicians continue to sow distrust in the minds of ordinary people. Talk is rife now about how things are again like they were in 1991-92 and there have been reports that the RS Government is already preparing ballots for an independence referendum.

Failure to renew EUFOR’s mandate or including OHR’s termination in a UNSCR will play right into the hands of secessionists intent on abrogating Dayton and taking the region back to a very dark time. These people are betting on a weak response from the West, which they calculate is too busy with problems elsewhere. I hope you will agree that it would be monstrous to allow this to happen. Surely the International Community can ill-afford to have its successful post-conflict efforts in BiH over-turned into a humiliating defeat. Nor can it afford to allow images of people fleeing areas in which they are ethnic minorities, fearing the worst will happen again in the space of the same generation. Only robust and joined up action by the US and the EU can stop this madness from happening.

Thank you for your attention. I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Testimony: Mr. Douglas Davidson 
Head of Mission - OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo

November 8, 2007

Thank you for offering me the opportunity to talk about the OSCE and its role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s recovery from conflict. For twelve years we in the OSCE have been one part of a larger effort to help Bosnia and Herzegovina become a modern, multi-ethnic democratic state. Our role in this effort is, I think, a distinct one. High politics we leave to the High Representative. Instead we try to help build democracy from the ground up.  
 
In his book Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Modern Democracy, Donald Kagan observes that: “Although in our time democracy is taken for granted, it is in fact one of the rarest, most delicate and fragile flowers in the jungle of human experience…an examination of the few successful democracies in history shows that they need to meet three conditions if they are to flourish. The first is to have a set of good institutions; the second is to have a body of citizens, who possess a good understanding of the principles of democracy, or who at least have developed a character consistent with the democratic way of life; the third is to have a high quality of leadership, at least at critical moments.” If Professor Kagan is correct, we cannot yet describe Bosnia and Herzegovina as a successful democracy. It has not yet fully met the three conditions needed for democracy to flourish.  
 
This is not for want of trying. In our part of the effort to help democracy flourish, we in the OSCE have striven to help create precisely such a set of good institutions. We have not only sought to strengthen the structures of government – executive, legislative, and judicial alike – we have also encouraged these structures to become more transparent in their work, more accountable to their constituents, and more cognizant of the underlying principles of democracy and human rights to which they have subscribed. The strengthening of the structures of government is, however, not enough in itself to create democracy. Openness and transparency and democracy, after all, do little good if citizens are unwilling or unable to take advantage of them – if they are unwilling or unable to participate actively in their own governance and thus to ensure that their elected and appointed representatives are held responsible for their decisions and actions. This requires a genuine and active civil society.  
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina such a civil society is still largely absent. A feeling of helplessness, of apathy and disengagement, appears to be pervasive among the citizenry. Political affiliations tend to conform to ethnic affiliations. People do not readily band together – especially across ethnic lines – to advance a common cause. We have sought to overcome this by seeking to nourish the growth of a body of citizens who possess a good understanding of the principles of democracy.  
 
This has proven to be one of the hardest parts of our job. We have learned through experience that you cannot simply give people money to form a non-governmental organization and expect this to result in effective civil society. We have found that it makes more sense to seek out, assist, and support those who already wish to help one another. Under-represented groups of people in politics and public life, particularly youth and women, need encouragement too. We are devoting especial attention to youth because we are concerned about the “brain-drain” – the continuing departure of the country’s brightest young people to western Europe and North America, a journey that about seventy percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s younger citizens say they would like to make. We want to encourage these young men and women to recognize that, if they stay in the country, they can make a difference. Without them, we fear, the country has no future.  
 
The Dayton Agreement also assigned to the OSCE a role in promoting, protecting, and preserving human rights. The return of refugees and displaced people to their homes has long been one of our prime human rights concerns. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina displaced roughly half of the pre-war population of four million people. The destruction to property was similarly sweeping. Today, however, most of the property lost in war is now once again in the hands of its original owners. This is a rare achievement in countries recovering from war.  
 
The restoration of property did not happen automatically or without turmoil. It required a new property law and a plan to implement it. This realization arose in response to a phenomenon that had become obvious a few years after war’s end: despite the existence of Annex Seven of the Dayton Agreement, few people had actually returned to their pre-war homes. The Property Law Implementation Plan process – “PLIP,” for short – brought international oversight to bear over the administrative procedures by which pre-war owners or occupants reclaimed their property. It worked. By now, almost all of the claims submitted – and there were slightly more than two hundred thousand of them – have been resolved and most have resulted in the repossession of the properties in question.  
 
The successful repossession of property does not, however, mean that all problems related to residence in a community disappear. The OSCE has therefore turned its attention from repossession itself to the other things necessary to make return to pre-war homes sustainable and successful. Here, too, the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a successful multi-ethnic or multi-confessional state is less than complete. Discrimination against and intimidation of minorities in communities throughout the country still too frequently occurs.  
 
A culture of impunity also impedes return. It exists in matters large and small. Despite the nearly unanimous passage four years ago by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a law regulating primary and secondary education and despite commitments made by the government of the Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe upon joining that organization to end such practices, schools remain divided by ethnicity. Despite the adoption of new criminal procedure codes and the creation of a war crimes chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, war criminals still walk free and even continue to work in public institutions, including the police. The rule of law – that is, good laws fairly enforced – is too often lacking. This, too, hinders the development of democracy.  
Obstacles both hidden and overt block the fair and effective prosecution of war crimes cases. Ethnic bias in local courts still prevents justice from taking its proper course. In addition, the countries of this region all have constitutional or legal provisions against extradition. These provisions permit those suspected or even convicted of crimes, not least of war crimes, in Bosnia and Herzegovina to flee across borders and, thanks to dual citizenship, to avoid incarceration. The OSCE has for several years attempted to promote greater regional cooperation in war crimes prosecution as a means to end this particular kind of impunity and to bring criminals to justice. These attempts have foundered on the unwillingness of the governments involved to transfer proceedings or to change their laws or constitutional restrictions on extradition. We can only hope that similar initiatives launched more recently by the United States of America and the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina meet with more success.  
 
Education presents another large barrier to the advancement of the country. The classroom can, if misused, be a most efficient means of perpetuating prejudices. Bosnia and Herzegovina essentially has three school systems – one for each constituent people. They contribute to the growing divide in the country. Students emerge from them having little knowledge of the other nationalities and national minorities with which they share their state. Their schools may also reinforce beliefs about the particular uniqueness and superiority of one’s own group over the others in the country. Ideally, of course, each state should seek to educate its citizens so that they become tolerant and reasoning adults prepared for their duties as citizens of a democracy. Bosnia and Herzegovina has committed to educating its future citizens in this way by virtue of the international covenants it has signed, the international pledges it has made, and the international organizations it has joined. But the reality of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is, sadly, somewhat different.  
 
The Rand Corporation concluded a recent study of nation-building with a chapter called “lessons learned.” Among other things, it said this: “Democratization is the core objective of nation-building…what distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo on the one hand from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan on the other are not their levels of economic development, western culture, or national homogeneity. Rather, what distinguish these two groups are the levels of effort the international community has put into their democratic transformation. Successful nation-building…needs time and resources.”  
 
That, I think, is certainly true in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also true, I think, that the democratic transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet run its course. To become a truly successful democracy, it will most likely require more time and more resources. Whether the international community still has sufficient appetite to devote more time and more resources to this country is a question I cannot answer. I can only say I hope it does.

Testimony: Mr. Adam Boys 
Chief Operating Officer - International Commission on Missing Persons, Sarajevo

November 8, 2007

1. The first Chairman of ICMP - Cyrus Vance - observed that “peace is a psychological as well as a physical state and helping the grieving is essential to achieving full peace.”  
 
2. Families of the missing are among those most affected by trauma and fear. Not only have they lost family members, but they are often refugees or displaced persons as well. Consequently, they easily fall prey to nationalist political manipulation. Breaking that link is critical to the successful implementation of any post war agreement.  
 
3. The International Community’s first High Representative in Bosnia - Carl Bildt - describing post conflict societies; said that, moving forward depends on overcoming the fears of the past. The recent conflicts in former Yugoslavia vividly illustrate the perils that result from failures to address the past.  
 
4. In the build up to the recent conflicts, opportunistic nationalists exploited post Second World War efforts to conceal previous inter-ethnic and political atrocities. They grossly exaggerated or grossly understated the numbers of dead and inferred the existence of hidden mass graves to stir up ethnic hatred, fear and distrust. Concealed mass graves may consequently be seen as “political landmines” that threaten the stability of societies for generations to come.  
 
5. There have been more recent attempts to abuse the issue of missing persons for political gain. Extreme examples include the Government of the Republika Srpska, initially denying that 8,000 men and boys were missing from the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, and the Milosevic regime seeking to hide evidence regarding the disappearance of over 800 persons from Kosovo who were transported and buried near the Serbian capital of Belgrade. In both cases, the governments tried to conceal the fact that atrocities were committed.  
 
6. With no binding international legal instruments to address the human rights aspects of missing persons from armed conflicts and crimes against humanity, the regions of the former Yugoslavia were hard pressed to address the reality of over 40,000 persons missing at the end of hostilities.  
 
7. To assist in finding a solution President Clinton announced the creation of ICMP. In his words the primary tasks of ICMP were:  
 
8. To secure the full co-operation of the parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement in locating and identifying the missing from the four year conflict and to assist them in doing so….to support and enhance the work of [other organizations in their efforts]…[to] encourage public involvement in its activities and….to contribute to the development of appropriate expressions of commemoration and tribute to the missing.  
9. Overcoming political inertia on the ground was a high priority for international and local policy makers in the aftermath of the war. Recognizing that uncertainty over the fate of the missing was an obstacle to reconciliation and peace-building in the region, Cyrus Vance invited eminent representatives of the international community to act as ICMP Commissioners, while governments of the region nominated representatives to participate in decision-making and to secure local political commitment.  
 
10. Then ICMP started to develop a three-pronged approach to the problem. Working directly with governments, using forensic sciences, and supporting civil society actors, ICMP has achieved results in a way that has ensured sustainability and encouraged local ownership of the process.  
 
11. By embedding our efforts within the domestic structures of the locations in which we work, ICMP has acquired a unique expertise in guiding post-conflict states through the difficult task of accounting for the past. In so doing, states not only meet their human rights obligations, they also build institutional capacity that promotes long-term public confidence in state prosecutors, the police, forensic investigators, judicial systems and in parliamentary systems. Indeed, pursuing answers to questions about gross violations will assist the governments of post-war states to win back the public trust by ensuring fair treatment for victims and ensuring that the perpetrators of atrocities cannot escape justice.  
 
12. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the state government has, with the assistance of ICMP and the International Committee of the Red Cross, drafted and adopted unique enabling legislation, such as the Law on Missing Persons. It has also established the Missing Persons Institute, an institution responsible for pursuing cases of missing persons regardless of national identity. Civil society initiatives have encouraged the development of cross-boundary networking between associations of family members that exert pressure on governments to release information on the whereabouts of mass graves. These groups have also lobbied for and received the same rights and social benefits as those of families of veterans or fallen soldiers. And, these networks of associations have also facilitated the collection of blood samples from survivors to assist in the DNA-led identification process.  
 
13. ICMP considers family members to be integral to the satisfactory resolution of missing persons cases. By consulting them and by creating a mechanism for them to directly engage with governments, they are fully included in a transparent process where responsibilities are defined and accountability clear.  
 
14. ICMP’s forensic teams have pioneered novel, rapid and cost-effective techniques for identifying sets of mortal remains that have been intentionally disturbed. Initially, forensic experts had deemed progress on such complex issues unlikely, since in the process of moving and re-concealing victims, many mortal remains had been dislocated and spread across numerous hidden graves.  
 
15. Early inability to make positive identifications granted war criminals a measure of protection Uncertainty as to the identity of those in the graves enabled the denial of atrocities. Indeed, one Serbian government minister reported that many of those buried in a mass grave in Belgrade were Serbs when in fact all 800 were Kosovo Albanian. And, Milosevic’s wife is reported to have said that all those buried there were Serbs murdered during Nazi occupation.  
 
16. ICMP’s advances in identification techniques directly undermine these attempts to deny mass atrocities. They bring to light irrefutable evidence that links specific individuals to particular crimes. Through the identification process, then, evidence is uncovered and victims’ humanity is restored. ICMP’s success in developing these new DNA matching techniques has made it a leader in advancing forensic technologies and is a prime example of science in the service of truth and justice. To the 2nd of November 2007 these efforts in the former Yugoslavia have resulted in 12,744 DNA-based identifications (including 10,659 for Bosnia and Herzegovina) bringing long-awaited answers to damaged communities.  
 
17. Initially, it seemed likely that there would be a very limited number of identifications relating to the fall of Srebrenica in 1995. Attempts had been made to conceal mass graves by digging them up and reburying remains in multiple locations. By combining intensive anthropological analysis with selective DNA testing of mortal remains from highly commingled sites identifications are possible though the cost is relatively high. At one fifth of the total number of missing from the former Yugoslavia, work related to Srebrenica accounts for more than 50% of ICMP’s work because of the complexity of these graves.  
 
18. In October 2007, having completed a series of secondary but linked mass graves ICMP produced a record 799 matching reports in one month. By early November 2007, six years to the month since the first DNA match, ICMP had produced DNA identification for a total of 5,000 different individuals from the fall of Srebrenica. In addition, because of a very high – 99.2% - chance of an exhumed bone finding a match in the database of blood and bone samples, we can say with certainty that the total number of missing from the fall of Srebrenica is 8,000 men and boys.  
 
19. Using DNA for identifications has become a matter of course in many parts of the world. At the technical level it often represents the only reliable means of identification. At the political level, DNA offers the significant benefit of scientific accuracy in identifications, thereby pre-empting an often potential exploitation and manipulation of the missing persons issue.  
 
20. However, these sophisticated technical methods rely upon the political will of governments to deal with the issue of missing persons. Governments should be responsible for trying to address the concerns raised by human rights violations committed by a previous regime. They should investigate and publicly disclose reliable facts about the missing. In addition, victims should be able to assert their legal rights for truth and justice in determining the fate of missing persons, as well as for related social and economic rights. Finally, for the sake of society and future peace in the region, states must comply with international judicial mechanisms such as the ICTY. 
21. The ICMP is entering the final phase of its work in the former Yugoslavia. Hopefully the gains made can be solidified into durable and sustainable solutions. ICMP has already begun applying its model to states beyond the Balkans. ICMP is currently working with Iraq and Colombia regarding ways in which support can be provided to investigations into unresolved cases.  
 
22. Sadly, this issue is a global one. In the OSCE states there are serious concerns regarding missing persons in the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia as well as in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and on Cyprus. In the rest of the world - Sudan, Rwanda, Cambodia, Algeria, Nepal, the Philippines, Chile, Guatemala, Congo, Kashmir, East Timor - the list goes on. And it is not only in the area of post conflict assistance. Responses to natural disasters and terrorist attacks also require the sort of technical capacities that ICMP has developed.  
 
23. ICMP has been able to contribute in areas beyond the Western Balkans. Experts were sent to New York after the terrorist attacks to provide advice on the development of matching software and samples were sent from Louisiana for processing in ICMP’s labs after Hurricane Katrina.  
 
24. ICMP, in close cooperation with INTERPOL and with the national police forces of affected countries, has assisted in the identification of 902 victims of the Asian Tsunami in Thailand and in the Maldives. INTERPOL and ICMP will soon sign an agreement on cooperation in future Disaster Victim Identification.  
 
25. The United States and ICMP’s other donors have enabled the development of a unique capacity which has worldwide application. ICMP’s work, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has established a centre of excellence in the field of human identification. In a country where positive news is rare this is something to be celebrated.  
 
26. The work involved is labor-intensive, politically sensitive, and complex. It requires a diverse range of scientific, diplomatic, and bureaucratic resources needed for the effective resolution of cases and to ensure the rights of families. ICMP is unique in its ability to meet all of these needs in a comprehensive, coordinated approach.  
 
27. The war that was ended by Dayton Peace Agreement, the Kosovo conflict and the crisis in Macedonia have left deep scars in Western Balkan societies that have only begun to heal. Refugee displacement is a continuing regional problem that is underpinned by mutual mistrust, political manipulation and the anguish of those most affected by the recent conflicts. The continuing problem of large numbers of missing persons in particular aggravates the situation in the region, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.  
 
28. ICMP works with family members whose lives have been torn apart. For many of them the concept of reconciliation is hard to accept. However, they do demand the truth and they have reached across ethnic barriers to families in similar situations. United and determined, family associations of the missing meet at conferences organized by ICMP and to which high level government representatives are invited and attend. They closely question officials and issue joint declarations demanding of governments that they meet their obligations.  
 
29. Family associations across the former Yugoslavia invite each other to attend commemorations of their missing relatives. Six years ago they could barely manage to sit in the same room together.  
 
30. Governments in the region must be recognized for their efforts. The Government of Serbia has worked hard to resolve the fate of missing Kosovo Albanians, Bosnians and Croatians that went missing or ended up in Serbia. The Government of the Republika Srpska, in its revised report on Srebrenica, formally accepted ICMP’s numbers of missing. And, both Bosnian entities as well as Brcko District have cooperated to establish the Missing Persons Institute as a State level institution that has not been imposed by the International Community.  
 
31. It is difficult and perhaps too early to fully quantify the effects of this process on post war reconciliation. However, it is clear from many examples around the world as well as in the former Yugoslavia that not addressing the issue, not determining the truth of what happened, will allow the uncertainty to leave deep bitterness that will fuel future conflict.  
 
32. Revisionism and the intentional misuse of emotional factors linked to identity and victim-hood are the stock in trade of nationalists and indeed terrorists. Painstaking efforts to establish the truth, to restore identity and to seek redress will ultimately prevent the manipulation of history which is the rallying point for new conflict and new horrors.

Testimony: Ms. Diane Orentlicher 
Professor and Co-Director, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law - Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC

November 8, 2007

Chairman and distinguished members of this Commission, thank you for inviting me to testify about the importance of justice to the social reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. More than any other government body, this Commission has consistently kept sight of the important and challenging issues confronting the Balkans. While others have lost focus despite the need for sustained engagement, you never have.  
 
My testimony reflects research that I am currently undertaking on behalf of the Open Society Justice Initiative, which has taken me to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Serbia twice in the past year. This research examines the impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or ICTY, in the region that is directly affected by its work.  
 
I will make four principal points. First, the work of the ICTY is deeply important to Bosnians, for whom the hellish conflict that ended in 1995 is all too fresh and for whom criminal accountability is an essential element of their recovery.  
 
Second, while some of the ICTY’s prosecutions have already brought an important measure of justice, Bosnians are profoundly disappointed in what the ICTY has so far failed to accomplish. Above all, the fact that the two men who personify their suffering—Ratko Mladi? and Radovan Karadži?—are still at large more than twelve years after they were first charged with genocide is an almost incomprehensible failure of justice. For this, Bosnians blame not only the ICTY but the international community, which Bosnians see as aiding and abetting these two fugitives’ impunity.  
 
Third, one of the most tangible contributions of the ICTY has been its role in spurring the establishment of a domestic War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia, which is bringing justice home. But far more work remains to be done.  
 
Fourth, in Bosnia as in other countries in the former Yugoslavia, the positive impact of the ICTY would be significantly greater if the Tribunal were able to devote more resources to “outreach”, that is, to communicating effectively with Bosnian society.  
 
The Importance of Justice  
 
Justice is important to victims of all three major ethnic communities in Bosnia, but since the overwhelming majority of victims are Bosniaks, and also because the attitudes of Bosnian Serb and Croat victims toward the ICTY are comparatively complex, my observations will focus on Bosniaks’ need for justice.  
 
While the Bosniaks I have interviewed this year expressed many disappointments in the achievements of the ICTY, including disappointment in what many consider grossly inadequate sentences, virtually everyone emphasized how important the Tribunal’s work is to them and to their country. I was able to get a particularly vivid sense of this last November: I was in Sarajevo when the ICTY Appeals Chamber raised to life in prison the sentence of Stanislav Gali?, whom an ICTY Trial Chamber had sentenced to 20 years in prison for his leadership role in the siege of Sarajevo. Sarajevans were deeply gratified by this decision, which in their view honored their suffering and restored a moral balance that had been frightfully put awry.  
 
Bosniaks felt a similar sense of vindication by the ICTY’s determination in an earlier case that what happened at Srebrenica was a genocide. As one Bosniak woman put it (and as many said in similar terms), the ICTY’s “finding that what happened at Srebrenica was genocide is the most important achievement and without the ICTY this would not be possible.” (She said this before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reached the same conclusion in its February 2007 judgment, but I do not believe she would modify her views in light of that judgment. After all, the ICJ judgment relied heavily on the ICTY’s findings—and other aspects of its judgment are a profound disappointment to Bosniaks.)  
 
Some of my interlocutors told me that the ICTY’s recognition of rape as international crime has helped many rape victims in Bosnia. As one woman put it, “ICTY judgments created a new kind of awareness that women had been used as a means of war. They became visible, personalized, and recognized as one kind of victim. This enabled them to become more active,” for example in exercising their rights to obtain civil benefits.  
 
When I asked victims if the work of the ICTY was important to them, those I interviewed invariably said yes. When I followed up by asking them to explain why it was important, they found my question almost incomprehensible and assumed that I did not understand what they had experienced. What else could explain my question?  
 
I had one such exchange with a man in Prijedor who was 17 years old when he was detained in the infamous concentration camp at Omarska. While he survived this horrific ordeal, his 15-year-old brother and father were killed, along with dozens of other members of his extended family. When I asked him to explain why he believed, as he had told me, that it is important to punish those who commit crimes, he looked at me as though I had asked a thoroughly nonsensical question and patiently explained, “what I went through, whoever was in my shoes would like to see some justice being done.”  
 
The reasons why Bosniaks have placed hope in the ICTY are notably different than the reasons why progressive Serbians support the Tribunal, but its work is deeply important to them as well. During my interviews this past year, Serbian supporters of the ICTY expressed various reasons why they support the Tribunal, including the debt that Serbian society owes victims of atrocious crimes. But the most pervasive reason was framed in terms of Serbians’ hope that the legal truth established in The Hague would help dispel many of their fellow citizens’ continuing denial when it comes to Serbia’s role in the atrocities that raged across the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In their view, Serbia cannot move forward as a stable and mature democracy unless its society accepts this truth and the responsibility that comes with it.  
 
As my previous observations suggest, for Bosniaks the justice of the ICTY is more personal. Yet in both Serbia and Bosnia, many of my interlocutors expressed a common belief that justice is a necessary foundation for long-term reconciliation. Speaking of the ethnic atrocities committed during the 1990s conflicts, one Bosnian woman made the point this way, “If you just push it under the carpet, it will grow and it will be a real problem” in future inter-ethnic relations.  
 
Failure to Arrest Radovan Karadžic and Ratko Mladic  
 
While the contributions that the ICTY has already made are important, they risk being overwhelmed by one monumental failure: the fact that Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadžic, the two men who personify Bosniaks’ suffering, remain at large more than twelve years after they were first indicted on genocide charges. One of the people whom I interviewed in Sarajevo summed up what I heard from many Bosniaks: In her view, the ICTY has done “so many good things but they’re in the shadow of Karadzic and Mladic.” Because these two suspects have eluded justice for so long, she said, “many ordinary people [in Bosnia] can’t see the good things the ICTY has done.”  
 
In February 2007, the International Court of Justice ruled that Serbia’s continuing failure to apprehend Ratko Mladic and transfer him to The Hague is an ongoing violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention. This was the first time since the Convention’s adoption nearly half a century ago that a State has been legally judged to be in breach of the treaty. In the wake of this judgment, the international community should have redoubled its efforts to ensure that Mladic is apprehended. This has not happened.  
 
The international community has failed effectively to exercise its leverage to ensure the arrest of Mladic, who is known to have been sheltered in Serbia and is believed still to be there, and Karadžic, who is believed to be somewhere in the former Yugoslavia, possibly Serbia. As has often been noted, political pressure, particularly from the United States and the European Union, has been essential to Serbian cooperation with the ICTY. As a result of that pressure, Serbia has surrendered almost 40 suspects to the ICTY since 2000. Yet at crucial times, the international community has failed to maintain that pressure, and this has enabled Mladic and Karadžic to elude arrest.  
 
Yesterday the European Union (EU) took a preliminary step toward Serbian membership in the EU by initialing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia. This action followed an informal assessment by the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, to the effect that, while Serbia still has not extended full cooperation to the Tribunal, it has made sufficient progress in its cooperation to merit initialing the agreement.  
 
In a public assessment three weeks ago, Ms. del Ponte was less sanguine: Acknowledging that Serbian cooperation was better than it had been one year ago—a notably low bar of achievement—she found that while there had been some activity in the Serbian government’s “efforts to locate fugitives and identify networks protecting them” in recent months, “these actions were slow, irresolute and unsystematic.” In particular, “[t]he fact that Ratko Mladic is still at large after all the promises and declarations that have been made over the years clearly demonstrates that fact.” She concluded, “I am absolutely convinced that Serbia’s Government possesses the resources and the means to locate and arrest the fugitives.”  
 
Having initialed the SAA, it is manifestly important that the EU require Serbia to secure Mladic’s transfer to The Hague before it signs an SAA with Serbia. Similarly, if we obtain intelligence indicating that Karadžic is in Serbia, his surrender, too, must be secured.  
 
The United States must do its part, as well, to ensure that the shameful sheltering of Mladic and Karadžic at long last ends. We owe it to Bosnia as well as to Serbia to find effective ways to make clear that our relationship with Serbia will not be the kind of relationship that two mature democracies enjoy with each other until Serbia stops shielding a man who has twice been indicted for masterminding genocide.  
 
Earlier this year, the United States certified that Serbia had met congressional preconditions, one of which is cooperating with the ICTY, for disbursing U.S. economic aid appropriated for Serbia. This certification followed Serbia’s role in securing the arrests of two fugitives from the ICTY, which represented a welcome resumption of cooperation by the newly-formed government in Belgrade after a protracted period of non-cooperation. While this cooperation deserved recognition, the relevant certification law specifically mentioned the surrender and transfer of Ratko Mladic as an example of the type of cooperation expected from Serbia.  
 
A similar law was recently approved in the House and is now in conference. Although United States aid to Serbia is no longer substantial, the certification process required by U.S. law provides an important opportunity to convey to Serbia the importance we attach to its apprehension of Mladic.  
 
Many Bosniaks would feel deeply betrayed if the ICTY were to close its doors while Mladic and Karadžic continued to bask in the impunity of Serbian complicity. And there is no doubt that they would blame the United States as well as the EU for squandering the influence they can bring to bear to ensure that, however long delayed, justice is not forever denied them.  
 
Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions  
 
One of the most tangible contributions the ICTY has made in Bosnia (as well as Serbia) is to stimulate the creation of a national War Crimes Chamber and to help ensure that it meets international standards of fair process. A major impetus for the establishment of the Chamber was the impending end of the ICTY’s work, which is supposed to complete all of its proceedings by 2010. To ensure that it could do so, the ICTY needed to be able to refer many of its pending cases to national courts. Since the majority of ICTY cases not yet prosecuted but under investigation or indictment emanated from Bosnia, the Tribunal wanted to ensure that Bosnia in particular could handle referrals. And so, as part of its completion strategy, the ICTY helped establish a domestic court in Bosnia to which it could confidently refer cases that the Tribunal would be unable to complete itself.  
 
The ICTY’s efforts to put its completion strategy in place coincided with a comprehensive reform of the Bosnian criminal system by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The two institutions collaborated in designing a national war crimes chamber for Bosnia, and in early 2005 the OHR established the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) as part of a new State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have played important and constructive roles in preparing the Chamber to operate effectively.  
 
Until the WCC began to operate, the record of Bosnian courts in prosecuting war crimes committed during the 1990s conflicts was abysmal. Although many thousands of people were victims of atrocities during the 1990s conflict, only 54 domestic war crimes cases are known to have reached the trial stage in Bosnian courts before 2004.  
 
This picture has changed dramatically as a result of the WCC’s work. Now, credible war crimes prosecutions are taking place in the country where the overwhelming majority of victims reside. While the ICTY does not deserve all of the credit for this development, it is hard to imagine the WCC operating today without the ICTY paving the way. In the words of a Bosnian journalist whom I interviewed during one of my visits to Bosnia during the past year, “If there had been no Hague Tribunal, it’s a big question when or whether domestic bodies would start processing war crimes cases.”  
 
The process of devolving ICTY cases to national war crimes prosecutors in the Balkans has had wider benefits in terms of regional cooperation. In the words of an attorney in the OSCE Belgrade mission, “Co-operation among the prosecutors in the region is generally steadily progressing in war crimes matters. They meet each other frequently and they exchange evidence and information in concrete cases. ...” This is not to say that war crimes-related cooperation with the region is what it should be, but it has improved significantly. While several developments, including the ICTY’s recent verdict in the Vukovar Three case, have revived tensions among the region’s major ethnic groups, the national war crimes prosecutors, according to the OSCE mission in Belgrade, “were those who were calming the tensions down, often publicly commending each other’s work.”  
 
The establishment and operation of the WCC is a milestone, and the Chamber has benefited in myriad ways from the infusion of expertise as well as evidence provided by ICTY staff and other institutions. Yet it faces several major challenges. Among them, the Chief Prosecutor has not yet adopted a national strategy for prosecutions. Without one, his office has often been reactive rather than strategic in its selection of cases.  
 
In addition, the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber suffered a major setback in May, when Radovan Stankovic escaped from prison after being convicted by the WCC of serious war crimes, including responsibility for supervising a notorious rape came in Foca and personally raping three women there. Stankovic’s case was the first one transferred from the ICTY to the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber and his conviction was the Chamber’s first. The ICTY is understandably concerned about Stankovic’s flight from justice, noting that the failure to apprehend him “has undermined the reputation of the judicial and other institutions in [Bosnia and Herzegovina]”  
 
Six months after his escape, Stankovic is thought to be hiding in Serbia or Montenegro. What is more certain than his exact whereabouts, according to press accounts, is that “there is almost no cooperation with Serbia concerning the search for Stankovic.” Once again, there is a direct line between thwarted justice for Bosnian victims and Serbian obstruction.  
 
Finally, while donors have understandably focused on the WCC, which plays the leading role in Bosnia’s war crimes prosecutions, they have not yet provided adequate support to entity-level courts. Yet just as the ICTY can prosecute only a relatively small fraction of war crimes committed in Bosnia, the WCC can prosecute only the most serious cases that have not been prosecuted by the Hague tribunal. If the ICTY is to succeed in paving the way for what must be a sustainable process of providing justice to victims of ghastly crimes, international actors must play their part to ensure this happens. More specifically, the United States and other donors need to ensure that a coordinated approach is in place for prosecuting outstanding war crimes cases and that all of the courts that will play a role in this process are able to conduct fair trials.  
 
Outreach  
 
As has so often been noted, the ICTY’s geographic and cultural distance significantly affects the ability of Bosnians to engage with the Tribunal. But its location in The Hague would not be so problematic in this respect if its work were better understood throughout Bosnia. Unfortunately, however, the ICTY’s judgments have been interpreted by local politicians who politicize its verdicts as well as by nationalist media. As an astute observer in Republika Srpska noted, for much of the ICTY’s history the only reflections in Bosnia of what was happening in The Hague “were the ones that could pass through the manipulation of the media and political bosses here in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  
 
While this failure lies squarely on the shoulders of political leaders, the ICTY can do more to counter manipulation of its work. But it needs donor support to make this possible.  
 
Within the limited budget available for outreach activities in Bosnia, the ICTY has in recent years participated in some remarkable programs in towns that were once the scene of horrific crimes. Organized in collaboration with local partners, these programs have provided an opportunity to bypass the distortions of local politicians and media and explain directly to local residents what crimes have been judged to have been committed in their midst—and why.  
 
An extraordinary Bosnian Serb, Branko Todorovic, has played a leading role in organizing these programs. Last November, when I visited Todorovic in Banja Luka, he described for me the transformative impact of these programs. Other Serbs whose knowledge of the ICTY had long been filtered by local political leaders and ethnic media were, in Todovoric’s words, finally “able to see the factual truth, not the political truth,” and they grasped that “the truths are horrible.” This revelation was, he said, “very, very powerful.” These outreach programs provided local Serbs with an opportunity “to say that what happened is horrible and I want to be different.”  
 
Todorovic illustrated the value of these programs by describing breakthrough moments in various ICTY outreach programs. Let me share with you two examples. First, the representatives of the ICTY at a program in Brcko were able to dispel a pernicious rumor that had long festered and grown within the Muslim community of Brcko. The rumor was that Serbs had burned the bodies of Muslim victims in ovens normally used to cremate animals. One participant in the ICTY outreach program asked ICTY representatives why they had not investigated this allegation, and an ICTY police investigator was able to explain that in fact they had investigated reports of this episode. He explained in detail how the investigators were able definitely to establish that Serbs had not in fact burned Muslim victims, as had long been rumored. Todorovic thought that, if this expert had not been able persuasively to set this rumor to rest, “it would always cause hate” in Brcko. Instead, “the book on that was closed.”  
 
Todorovic also told me about a man at an ICTY outreach program in Prijedor who had lost many family members as a result of Serb atrocities during the 1990s conflict. At the end of the outreach program, this man said that that day had been one of the most important in his life since the dearest members of his family had been killed fourteen years earlier. In Todorovic’s words, “it meant so much that his neighbors, Serbs, were present and therefore admitted that the crime was committed. It was a contribution to the reconciliation after the war.”  
 
These examples provide a small glimpse into the kind of impact that the ICTY’s justice could have if the Tribunal had a greater outreach capacity. Yet outreach has always been an extra-budgetary and under-funded program. This is shortsighted: When a court delivers justice from afar, its verdicts do not speak for themselves. Too often, their meaning has been deformed by nationalist leaders.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Chairmen, most people outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot begin to fathom the importance of justice to survivors of Bosnia’s passage through hell. But this Commission has understood, and has insisted that our country not lose sight of the important challenges we still confront. Above all, as the ICTY approaches the end of its mandate, it is critically important to ensure that its contributions are not undermined and overwhelmed by its failure to try the two men who, for Bosnians, are the faces of their collective nightmare - Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadžic.